Misplaced optimism

While flight proximity to storms is understood to be hazardous, many pilots underestimate the risk on the ground. However, weather systems that appear routine often are not. A sense of safety on the ramp or taxiway can be misleading, and under convective conditions, especially with developing storms, close supervision of students and new instructors is essential even if storms are a daily occurrence in the summertime.

The pilots

In the left seat was the 22-year-old CFI, who had single- and multiengine land ratings, 312 hours total time, 148 hours time in type, and 255 hours as pilot in command. The commercial pilot, whose age was not reported, was in the right seat because he had expressed interest in obtaining a flight instructor certificate. He had 3,000 hours total time and six hours time in type.

The event

A 3,000-hour commercial pilot working on his multiengine rating was scheduled to fly with a new CFI on September 1, 2022. The pilots, flying a Diamond DA42 Twin Star , requested an IFR clearance from Orlando Executive Airport (ORL) at 4:37 p.m. EDT and received taxi clearance four minutes later. Ground control advised Runway 7 and issued a current special weather report: winds from 150 degrees at 11 knots, gusting to 16, variable between 110 and 180 degrees, thunderstorms in the area, 10 miles visibility, scattered clouds at 4,100 feet, broken clouds at 6,000 feet, and distant lightning in all quadrants. The high ceiling and good visibility could lead the unwary into a bad place.

Seven minutes later, the flight advised that they would stay in holding area Alpha 7 to see if the weather would pass. At the time of the event, ORL reported wind from 100 degrees at 32 knots gusting to 58 knots, varying between 060 and 130 degrees, one-quarter-mile visibility, thunderstorm, heavy rain, and fog. At approximately 5 p.m., a strong gust struck the aircraft from the left, rolling it inverted. The integrated roll bar above the cockpit fractured. The instructor sustained injuries; the pilot undergoing training, seated on the right side of the aircraft, was fatally injured.

The aircraft

The NTSB found no pre-crash malfunction in the Diamond DA42, which was manufactured in 2022 and had 285 hours total time; it had been 86 hours since the last 100-hour inspection.

The weather

A stationary front extended through Georgia, with a trough nearly centered over the accident site. The National Weather Service Storm Prediction Center noted that while widespread severe storms were unlikely, isolated downburst winds were possible.

At first glance, this described a typical Florida summer pattern where the storms could be easily circumnavigated, but current local data told a very different story. A convective sigmet covered much of Florida, warning of severe embedded thunderstorms with minimal movement, tops above FL450, and wind gusts up to 50 knots.

At Orlando International Airport (MCO), just seven miles south of ORL, two special weather reports were issued: At 4:31 p.m., probably after the crew had departed the training facility, MCO issued a special report with winds variable at 16 gusting to 36 knots, heavy thunderstorms, and runway visual ranges as low as 1,400 feet. At 4:37 p.m., just as the Diamond was calling for taxi instructions, International Tower reported winds from 090 degrees at 23 gusting to 36 knots, RVR for Runway 35L 1600V2400 feet with a heavy thunderstorm and lightning in all quadrants. A subsequent special report four minutes later showed only minor improvement with winds gusting to 38 knots.

According to the NTSB, “The surviving flight instructor reported that they received a weather briefing before the flight and that there was a small area of precipitation about 7 miles to the south, slowly moving north; they expected the area of precipitation would be in the vicinity after their departure. He stated that the cell did not appear to be developing significantly when observed on their radar.” Based on the radar picture, that was clearly not the case.

Commentary

The NTSB attributed the probable cause to “The flight crew’s insufficient evaluation of the deteriorating weather conditions in the area, which resulted in an encounter with a microburst.”

While accurate, the NTSB’s finding does not fully address the underlying human factors. New pilots and instructors rely heavily on academic weather training; practical judgment and pattern recognition develop only with experience. As Mark Twain observed, “Never let your schooling interfere with your education.” (As a young CFI, I was counseled more than a few times on a variety of topics!) It is notable that the more experienced pilot in training, claiming 3,000 hours, did not assert much stronger concerns despite having significantly greater total flight time.

In commercial operations, NTSB investigations often examine management oversight, training, and dispatch policies in addition to crew actions. The flight operation’s website shows it offering many services including private through commercial training, CFI, multiengine, transition courses, aircraft management, maintenance, and sales.

In retrospect, the flight should not have been released. Both dispatch procedures and senior instructional oversight were inadequate, in my view. If it looks bad, it likely is and the visual conditions could not have been more ominous. Thunderstorms have a well-deserved reputation for morphing quickly from relatively benign to deadly in minutes. Conditions were likely dark, turbulent, and marked by continuous lightning, thunder, heavy rain, and gusty winds well before the cell reached the airport. Radar imagery prior to departure confirmed the storms were neither small nor isolated.

Pilots are frequently reminded that Nexrad imagery may be several minutes old. Microbursts can develop rapidly, with downdrafts exceeding 6,000 feet per minute, and gust fronts can extend many miles ahead of visible precipitation. While some storms allow close operations without consequence, it is often impossible to predict when a benign cell will become severe. Delta Air Lines lost a Lockheed L–1011 in Dallas to a rapidly developing microburst in 1985.

Evaluating upstream weather trends and allowing additional time—often as little as an hour—can dramatically improve safety margins.

The consequences of this event were devastating: a life lost, an aircraft destroyed, and a young instructor burdened with lasting professional and personal consequences. There was no ill intent—only inexperience and misplaced optimism, combined with a failure of oversight.

Bruce Landsberg is the retired NTSB vice chairman, past president of the AOPA Foundation and Air Safety Institute, and author of Learning from Icarus.