Fire in Marana

According to local news reports, the aircraft, a 2000 Piper PA–32R-301T Saratoga II TC, appeared to have overshot Marana's Runway 3 after two landing attempts. On the first attempt, the pilot, Tucson real estate developer Chris Sheafe, elected to go around. On the second try, he apparently was unable to stop the aircraft before it slid off the runway into a wide ditch. It then burst into flames, killing him and his wife, Jacque.

Data from FlightAware show that Sheafe broke the daylong, 950-nautical-mile journey from Springfield, Missouri, to Marana into three parts.

He and his wife left Springfield's Downtown Airport at 9:12 a.m. Central Daylight time, landing at Elk City Regional Business Airport in Oklahoma at about 11:30 a.m. They then departed Elk City at 12:45 p.m. for their next leg to Springerville Municipal Airport in Arizona, landing there more than three and a half hours later. The final and shortest leg, home to Marana, began just before 4 p.m. Mountain Standard Time and was due to arrive around 5 p.m., well before sunset.

Nevertheless, it was a long day of flying for the 80-year-old pilot, who logged more than seven hours of flight time. All told, including the breaks on the ground, the trip took almost 10 hours.

Marana Regional Airport is a nontowered airfield with two intersecting runways. The primary runway, 12/30, is 6,901 feet long, and had been closed (with notam issued) beginning on April 6. That was after Sheafe departed for his trip east, and two days before he returned. This was probably the runway that the pilot used most often, and with which he was probably most comfortable.

The shorter intersecting runway, 3/21, is 3,892 feet long, with a displaced threshold of about 500 feet. That means he had less than 3,400 feet to land his turbocharged aircraft.

Examining the flight track as the aircraft approached Marana, it appears it entered a wide left-hand downwind for Runway 3. At the time, Marana was reporting clear skies, 10 miles visibility, and virtually no wind.

The first thing we notice about the flight track, however, is that the aircraft was coming toward the airport at very high speed.

According to the pilot's operating handbook, the Saratoga's maximum landing gear operating speed is 136 knots, the maximum flap extension speed is 111 knots, and the final approach speed is somewhere between 75 and 80 knots. According to recorded ADS-B data, the aircraft was traveling at 169 knots on its downwind leg, slowing to about 120 knots on short final, and 107 knots as it crossed the threshold during the first landing attempt. The aircraft does not appear to have been configured for a safe landing, and perhaps sensing that the approach was not optimal, the pilot elected to go around and try again.

He turned left, although Runway 3’s published traffic pattern is actually to the right. While in the pattern, the aircraft never climbed above 2,500 feet msl, which is 500 feet below standard traffic pattern altitude of 3,000 feet msl. The Saratoga was still traveling at very high speed. ADS-B data indicate speeds significantly higher than the maximum flap extension speed throughout the downwind, base, and final legs of the final attempted landing approach. On the second short final and just 300 feet over the ground, the Saratoga was clocked at 126 knots.

Approaching the runway threshold again, the aircraft's speed was about 120 knots; the aircraft crossed the displaced threshold more than 90 feet above the runway, and it did not appear to actually touch down until well past the runway's halfway point, sending it careening into the culvert beyond.

Takeaways

While the NTSB preliminary report about this accident is pending, there are several factors that the agency is likely to consider. And initial indications offer several key lessons for all general aviation pilots.

First, always be prepared for something unexpected. On the day of the accident, Marana's primary runway was out of service, and the pilot may not have been accustomed to landing on the shorter runway. Pilots can mitigate such surprises by practicing landings on different kinds of runways whenever possible. Familiarity can be helpful, but pilots also need to be able to adjust quickly. In this case, the approach and sight picture to Runway 3 are different from what the pilot was probably used to—coming in from a different direction, facing a shorter and narrower landing area—which may have contributed to misjudging the approach.

Looking at the pilot's previous flight tracks, it appears that he had a habit of landing long, which posed no issue when using Marana's primary runway. The crosswind runway, however, is much shorter. Normalization of deviance—small rule-breaking, such as a habit of landing well beyond the numbers, that turns into accepted routine over time—can have devastating effects when the conditions change. Each accepted deviation, particularly If there are no negative consequences, lowers the threshold for the next, increasing the chance that this "new normal" will result in a serious incident or accident, like this one.

Second, always fly standard traffic patterns, no matter which runway you use. The FAA’s Airplane Flying Handbook's Chapter 8 states, "A pilot is not expected to have extensive knowledge of all traffic patterns at all airports, but if the pilot is familiar with the basic rectangular pattern, it is easy to make proper approaches and departures from most airports." That includes altitudes and speeds in every phase of the pattern, turns, and reports on the common traffic advisory frequency.

Flight tracks from the Saratoga's previous flights show that the pilot often flew nonstandard approaches and traffic patterns, at speeds that were far above those recommended by the Saratoga's POH.

Pilots need to remember that every landing is a go-around until it's not. If an approach is unstable, the safe decision is to break it off and try again, rather than attempt to salvage a landing at all costs. It appears the pilot saw trouble on his first time around, but not on the second. He may have been tired and eager to get on the ground after a very long day.

Fatigued pilots have trouble with attention, judgment, and reaction time. It becomes more difficult to manage the cockpit workload, especially during the final critical phase of flight, the approach and landing. Fatigue also increases the chance of missed checklist items, poor decisions, and fixation on one problem while overlooking others. And let's not forget, a tired pilot is motivated to get on the ground quickly and go home.

It is possible that the pilot was dealing with another emergency in the cockpit about which we currently have no information. Judging by the aircraft's speed, the pilot probably did not have an engine failure. But was there a fire? Were the avionics faulty? Were the control surfaces working properly? Did he have a medical event?

Regardless of what factors affected the pilot's final decisions, the accident serves as a stark reminder to pilots that every approach and landing must be properly prepared and thoroughly briefed prior to commencing the approach. It's worth taking up a safety pilot or an instructor every so often—even between flight reviews—to sense-check your habits and routines. Practice your technique and learn how to adjust appropriately for ever-changing conditions and runways at hand.

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