Open door factors in fatal RV–10 accident

The RV–10 was about 100 feet in the air after takeoff when this observation was made, and the eyewitness was unable to follow the action from there as the departing aircraft flew away, though others helped NTSB investigators piece together the sequence of events detailed in a preliminary report that focuses most of the attention on the open door.

Pilot Pascal Reid reported "immediate landing required" soon after departure, and initially stated he would land on Runway 6, the reciprocal of the runway he had just departed. According to the audio recording, Reid decided seconds later to attempt Runway 24 after being cleared to land in either direction. The NTSB report notes investigators were able to obtain recordings from the FAA that add to the recordings available immediately after the accident from LiveATC.net, documenting both sides of Reid's communications with the tower. The report also notes additional details about the final seconds, the aircraft passing the Runway 24 threshold on the downwind leg at 435 feet msl (airport elevation is 96 feet) at 85 knots during the attempt to return to Runway 24.

The aircraft's builder and owner, Reid died along with his passenger and teenage daughter, when the RV–10 stuck the roof of a furniture outlet warehouse about 1,500 feet from the threshold of Runway 24. The impact and ensuing fire injured 19 people inside the building, 11 of them seriously.

The NTSB preliminary report notes the left-side door was visible in security camera footage of the aircraft departing the runup area, down but not flush with the fuselage. It separated from the aircraft just before impact and was found on the roof of the building. Additional witnesses, all pilots, observed the final stages of the flight as the RV–10 flew the downwind leg, which they described to investigators as a lower-than-normal approach, the RV–10 "banking aggressively left as it made the transition from downwind to base. Three witnesses then saw the airplane roll aggressively again to the left for what they assumed was a turn to final, all stating that they could almost see the full wing profile, and were concerned it may stall. The airplane then rolled right as its nose dropped, and dove towards the warehouse where it collided in a fireball."

The witnesses also saw a white, panel-like piece fall from the airplane just before impact. Investigators found the door on the roof of the damaged building, and determined that a secondary safety latch shipped by the manufacturer to Reid in 2010 was never installed.

A Van's Aircraft Service Bulletin issued in January 2010 directs owners to install the safety latch assembly, which includes an aluminum hook that engages as the door's edge comes within range, prior to full closure. Installation was directed "before further flight."

The gull-wing doors on both sides of an RV–10 are secured by top hinges and locking pins at the bottom of the frame, forward and aft. The secondary latch, mounted on the bottom of the door frame, was added to the original design and made standard on all kits shipped on or after January 4, 2010. Reid, who received his first kit components in 2007 and completed the build in 2011, was shipped a safety latch kit on January 25, 2010, the NTSB report notes.

While many general aviation aircraft can fly relatively undisturbed by a door opening in flight, the RV–10 is a different story. Online discussions among RV–10 builders and owners have noted the danger of an open door departing the aircraft in flight and striking the horizontal stabilizer, rendering the aircraft uncontrollable. Pilots who have experienced an RV–10 door opening in flight have described the event as violent and disruptive.

The NTSB report notes that Reid made some modifications to the door design, including replacement of aluminum locking pins with steel pins—and, more significantly, the absence of two of the four magnetic switches included in the kit that trigger LED indication lights that confirm that the door is locked.

"As such, the modified system would not have warned the pilot if the forward latch pins had failed to fully engage," the report states. Investigators found the left door handle short of the locked position. When they moved the handle forward, the pins extended nearly half an inch further, and the locking button engaged.