Change of emergency plan preceded fatal accident

A Van's Aircraft RV–10 flown by its builder and owner, Pascal Reid, with his teenage daughter aboard struck a furniture warehouse outlet just under 1,200 feet from the runway pavement and exploded as it punched through the roof of the building, killing both aircraft occupants and injuring 19 people inside the building, 11 of whom were transported to hospitals for treatment.

While authorities did not immediately release the identity of the pilot or passenger, a soccer team at Huntington Beach High School identified the pair in a January 3 Instagram post as Kelly Reid, "a loved member of the varsity team," and her father, Pascal Reid, who was the registered owner of the aircraft that he built in 2011, and who held a private pilot certificate issued in 2012, according to FAA records.

Comparison of the time-stamped air traffic control audio recorded by LiveATC.net and the GPS tracks recorded by FlightAware and Flightradar24 reveals the pilot reported "immediate landing required" at 2:07:51 p.m. Pacific time, 86 seconds after being cleared for takeoff from Runway 24 at Fullerton Municipal Airport. The controller had advised "left downwind approved" with the takeoff clearance and reported the wind was from 200 degrees at 3 knots.

ADS-B data began to record when the aircraft reached 375 feet, climbing on runway heading and accelerating to 114 knots. (The altitude data accuracy depends in part on the aircraft altimeter setting, and GPS measures groundspeed.) The emergency transmission began 10 seconds after the first ADS-B return.

Available recorded audio did not capture the aircraft's transmissions from the ground, and it is not clear if the left downwind approval was for a departure, or if Reid intended to stay in the pattern.

A moment within the 33 seconds that followed Reid's "immediate landing required" transmission and his confirmation of intent to land on Runway 24 is likely the moment at which a potentially survivable emergency became an inevitable tragedy.

Examination of the wreckage by the NTSB may reveal more about the nature of the problem that precipitated Reid's urgent call to return to land, initially on Runway 6—the opposite direction from which he had just launched—and whether the aircraft's engine was producing any power. It is unclear why Reid opted to attempt to fly a standard traffic pattern and return to Runway 24.

'Traffic's no factor'

A Cessna 172 was cleared for takeoff following Reid's RV–10 (N8757R) and the tower controller acted quickly in response to Reid's declaration of a need to return to land, directing the outbound Cessna to turn right to remain clear of the RV in distress. The controller's first response to "immediate landing required" was to inquire, "Can you make a left turn?"

"I'm coming into Runway Six, Five-Seven-Romeo," Reid replied.

The controller's response was immediate: "Five-Seven-Romeo, traffic just rotated, continue for Runway Six," followed by "Cessna Six-Four-Three, make a right turn. Traffic ahead to your left on Runway Six emergency. Start a right turn, thank you."

Two seconds later, stepping on another transmission, the controller advised, "Five-Seven-Romeo, traffic's no factor. You're number one. Wind calm. Runway Six, cleared to land, or Runway Two Four. Runway Six or Two Four, cleared to land."

Reid responded two seconds later: "…going for Runway Two Six, going for Runway, ah, Two Four, sorry. Five-Seven-Romeo."

The controller replied, "All right Five-Seven-Romeo, your choice. Six or Two Four, either one, cleared to land."

"Thank you," Reid replied, then either "I'll make…" or "I'm a…Runway Two Four for Five-Seven-Romeo."

The RV–10 completed a roughly 180-degree turn from its departure course during this exchange, and, instead of continuing the turn to aim for the Runway 6 threshold, it remained south of the airport, flying a left downwind for Runway 24.

As Reid confirmed his intent to land on Runway 24, the approach end of Runway 6 was still ahead of him, at about his 11 o'clock position and about half a nautical mile away. Reid's decision to attempt to land on Runway 24 increased the distance the aircraft would have to remain airborne by about 1.5 nm beyond that point, and the aircraft crashed short of the runway, having flown about 1.25 nm after confirming intent for Runway 24.

The ADS-B ground tracks from FlightAware and Flightradar24 differ slightly, but the altitude data appear closely matched, reaching a maximum of 850 feet during a climbing turn back to the airport, with the groundspeed reaching a maximum of 127 knots just after Reid announced an urgent need to land.

The aircraft maintained a groundspeed of 114 to 122 knots during the turn back to the airport, according to data from both ADS-B records, then slowed to 84 knots on the downwind leg. The descent rate of about 600 feet per minute increased to more than 1,000 fpm before the RV–10 began to turn to a left base, following a more-or-less standard traffic pattern route, never much more or less than about 1,500 feet from the runway.

As an experimental aircraft, each builder determines the best glide speed of their Van's RV–10. Various online sources cite 63 knots as a recommendation. The aircraft's stall speed, according to the manufacturer, is 57 miles per hour, or 49 knots (with flaps extended). GPS recorded groundspeed was at least 73 knots until the final seconds of the flight.

A surveillance camera operated by custom automotive wheel maker Rucci Forged, about 400 feet away from the aircraft, captured the final second of the flight, as the RV–10 rolled sharply right, exposing its belly to the camera, three black tires visible in the overexposed and blurry image for an instant before a fireball erupts where the aircraft hit the roof of the Michael Nicholas Designs furniture warehouse store on Raymer Avenue.

More than 100 people escaped or were rescued from the building during the ensuing fire. First responders transported 11 people to hospitals and treated and released another eight people at the scene.

The point of impact, documented by helicopter news footage showing a hole in the roof, is 1,187 feet from the closest paved portion of Runway 24.

Plan continuation bias

NTSB investigators will likely learn more from the FAA radio communication recordings including the flight's original intent, which was either to remain in the pattern, or fly a left downwind departure.

One possible factor is a variation of plan continuation bias, defined as the continuation of a plan (in this case, to land on Runway 24) even when information (loss of engine power and rapidly decaying altitude in this case) suggests the plan should be abandoned. Examination of the wreckage by the NTSB may reveal more about the condition and function of the engine, and whether the loss of power was partial or complete.

An AOPA Air Safety Institute video on avoiding traffic pattern stalls highlights the differences between real-world and training scenarios, as well as the implications of being too low to recover from a stall or spin. While ADS-B altitude does not account for ground elevation and may vary from actual altitude depending on a number of factors, it appears that the ill-fated flight never climbed higher than 850 feet.

It is possible that the controller's clearance to land on either runway may have been interpreted as a suggested course of action, or misunderstood by the pilot, who was obviously under intense stress, dealing with a loss of engine power just after takeoff.