Final report on fatal Snodgrass accident released

Snodgrass was the only person aboard the single-engine, high-wing, tailwheel SIAI-Marchetti SM.1019B when it crashed shortly after becoming airborne.

Snodgrass was a well-known and respected aviator with 7,800 fighter hours, 1,200 carrier landings, and 5,000 hours of time in type in the F–14.

The July 6 NTSB report explained, “The pilot was attempting an intersection takeoff about midfield when, shortly after the airplane became airborne, it pitched up aggressively, rolled left, and descended into the ground in a nose-down attitude. Examination did not reveal any evidence of preaccident malfunctions or failures of the flight control system, and there was no evidence to indicate that the pilot’s seat had moved. Both the engine and propeller exhibited damage signatures consistent with high engine power at impact.”

In the report, the NTSB determined the probable cause of the accident to be “the pilot’s failure to remove the flight control lock before departure, which resulted in a loss of airplane control and impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was his failure to perform an adequate preflight inspection and flight control check before takeoff.”

The control lock on this aircraft “immobilized the aileron and elevator but still allowed for near-full movement of the rudder and tailwheel.” It also may have been difficult for the pilot to see, the report explained. “Although the control lock is painted red, its orientation when engaged results in the pilot viewing it directly down its length, at its narrowest profile. A pilot who owned a similar airplane stated that he had once become distracted during preflight checks and was able to taxi, initiate takeoff, and become airborne with the control lock engaged. He stated that, once he realized his mistake, removal of the lock was a struggle due to the forces imposed on the control stick during takeoff.”

In its findings, the NTSB indicated that the control lock did not sustain the kind of damage that would indicate it had been removed and stowed for flight. “The cabin floor, where the control lock tube should have been mounted for flight, was severely deformed and compressed. Had the lock been stowed during impact, it would have been pinned under the flight control stick, crushed longitudinally, and its retaining clip would have been deformed; however, the control lock and its retaining clip were essentially undamaged, and the lock was found raised off the floor. The locking arm on the control stick also showed no evidence of deformation or impact damage but had rotated about 90 [degrees] to the right of its normal position, as if forced into that position on impact while the control lock was still attached.”

Richard McSpadden, senior vice president of the AOPA Air Safety Institute, explained in his analysis of the NTSB report that a number of factors in the moments leading up to the accident indicate the pilot may have been “in a bit of a hurry,” failed to remove a gust lock from his flight controls, and didn’t perform a flight control check.

“A flight control check would have saved Dale Snodgrass’ life. So in Dale’s memory: Fuel, fire, flight controls. Those three things are the things that can really hurt pilots on takeoff. … In honor of Dale Snort Snodgrass, let’s all of us, fuel, fire, flight controls before every takeoff. Here’s a nickel on the grass for an iconic figure and somebody we’ll dearly miss.”