Deadly distractions
Employing the plus-3, minus-8 concept
The pilots were so preoccupied with the problem, however, that none of them noticed when the altitude-hold function of the autopilot tripped off. Nor did they notice the shallow descent that followed. Moments later, the big Lockheed crashed in the night-shrouded swamp.
From this tragedy came the lesson that at least one pilot of a three-man crew should be delegated to fly the airplane during the resolution of a mechanical problem. He should effectively ignore the difficulty and leave it to the others to resolve.
In the case of a two-pilot crew, one crewmember flies while the other deals with the emergency. The problem with this, however, is that such a division of responsibility makes it difficult for one pilot to monitor the progress of the other without being distracted. Worse off is the lone general aviation pilot who must both fly the aircraft and cope with operational demands as they occur.
Passengers also can be distracting. A classic case is the midair collision that occurred over downtown San Diego in 1978 when a Pacific Southwest Airlines Boeing 727 overran a Cessna 172. The recovered cockpit voice recorder revealed that laughter and irrelevant conversation took place between the Boeing pilots and a deadheading captain prior to impact. Investigators concluded that this accident probably would not have occurred had it not been for this distraction.
This tragedy gave rise to the “sterile cockpit” rule that prohibits nonessential conversation on the flight deck of an airliner while taxiing and during critical phases of flight, which includes all operations below 10,000 feet.
There is a lesson here for lightplane pilots. Because passengers can be dangerously distracting, they should be advised not to unnecessarily interrupt you during critical phases of flight. These mostly include the three minutes after takeoff and the eight minutes prior to landing. This plus-3, minus-8 concept was developed by the NTSB after concluding that this is when most accidents occur.
It is impossible to determine how many GA accidents have been caused by distractions in the cockpit, but it is safe to conclude that they are more of a contributing factor than we realize.
Inadvertent gear-up landings, for example, often are the result of distractions that interrupt a pilot’s routine. His attention is diverted such that he either forgets to lower the gear or fails to verify its position after it presumably has been extended. (A pilot should keep a hand on the gear switch or handle until confirming that the wheels are down and locked.)
The FAA claims that many stall/spin accidents are caused by distractions that lead to inattentiveness to airspeed and faulty stick-and-rudder coordination during low-altitude maneuvering. This explains why flight instructors are encouraged to be creative about distracting students during training that involves operating at low airspeed.
Those who read Ernie Gann’s masterful memoir, Fate Is the Hunter, probably will never forget Captain Ross lighting matches under co-pilot Gann’s nose as he attempted to execute a low-frequency range approach to minimums in a Douglas DC–2 while referencing only “needle, ball, and airspeed.” As soon as Gann would blow out one match, Ross would quickly strike another, which made it difficult to see the instruments. This infuriated Gann, but he completed the approach despite the sadistic distraction.
Although none of my captains were this outrageous in their training tactics, a few were at least as inconsiderate. I recall one cigar-smoking tyrant who kept the air in front of him clear by blowing his smoke in my direction.
Although not the kind of training the FAA has in mind, it nevertheless was effective. Gann later said, “Nearly four years would pass before I would again see Ross’ matches flaming before me. Then, even though distracted by the drumming of my heart, I would know their incalculable worth.”
Colorful and fascinating cockpit displays are intended to reduce pilot workload, but they, too, can be distracting at times. They provide so much absorbing data that we often spend too much time with our heads in the cockpit, and this, for example, can increase the potential for a midair collision.
Captain Ross’ solution to this might be to light matches in the faces of such pilots. His purpose would not be to make it more difficult to see the displays but to remind pilots that they would be well advised to spend more time looking elsewhere.
